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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the implementation process of the
conversion of Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AV-DLR) funding to the Navy Stock.
Fund. On April 1, 1985 this conversion was implemented to obtain the following
objectives: (1) to improve the supply system discipline; (2) to improve financial
flexibility; (3) to improve budget forecasting; (4) to improve material support
responsiveness. This thesis will examine the implementation process and present
specific recommendations for improving the management control o[ AV-DLRs in the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In recent years the Department of the Navy has come under criticism from the
general public on how its tax dollars are spent. In reaction to this, Congress has
placed tighter controls on the Navy-. The need for efficient and effective management
control has never been greater then it is today. The Navy is continually searching for
ways to improve its ability to optimize output while minimizing cost.
This study will examine one case where the initial funding for Aviation Depot
Level Repairables (AV-DLRs) has been converted from periodic appropriations to the
revolving Navy" Stock Fund (NSF). Originally the items were procured by the Aviation
Supply Office (ASO) and given to the end-user, a squadron, at no charge. This
procedure was termed a "free issue" and does not imply the type of control that is
required for an effective and efficient organization. A study was directed by the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) to determine the best way to improve the system. The
results from this study recommended conversion of the funding to the NSF. In
general, the proposal identified four objectives that would be accomplished:
(1) improve the supply system discipline;
(2) improve financial flexibility;
(3) improve budget forecasting;
(4) improve material support responsiveness;
April 1, 1985 was set as the target date for this conversion. This study will
evaluate the procedures that were implemented to carry out that change. It will
specifically look at an "ideal" management control system, problems that have arisen
with the conversion, and recommendations to improve the implemented system. The
four objectives will be evaluated to determine the degree of achievement of subsequent
to conversion.
The overall goal of this conversion was to optimize readiness with the limited
resources provided by Congress. The actual change in readiness will only be seen over
time. Therefore, other measures will be examined that do relate directly to readiness in
the long run.
B. METHOD
This section describes how the information was obtained for this study. A
literature search on management control and budget control was conducted. From this
information a management control process was derived for the non-profit organization,
with a heavy emphasis on use of budgets as a control tool. Comprehensive reviews of
the Federal Government budget process and Navy budget process were performed.
Then in depth research to attain a complete understanding of the AV-DLR process
from budgeting and funding through accountability was undertaken. The methodology
used in gaining this understanding follows: .
(1) The collection and review of all Navy instructions and material pertaining to
the AV-DLR svstem was conducted. This included implementation plans on
the conversion of the AV-DLR funding to the Navy Stock Fund.
(2) A review of studies that pertain to the AV-DLR process was also undertaken.
Studies on Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) funds were reviewed in this
process due to the similar funding requirements.
(3) Interviews were conducted with the Comptrollers of an East Coast and West
Coast Naval Air Station.
(4) A telephone interview was also conducted with the Naval Air Forces Pacific
AV-DLR funds manager.
C. ORGANIZATION
The organization and content of this study can be divided into three parts. The
first part includes Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 begins with the concept of control and
develops an "ideal" management control system. The chapter then continues with the
discussion of the non-profit organization and the importance of a budget as a control
tool in that system. This then leads into Chapter 3, which examines the Federal
budget process and the Navy budget process.
The second part starts with a comprehensive review of the history of the AV-
DLRs in Chapter 4. The problems with the old system and the reasons for the change
are explored. Chapter 5 then proceeds to examine the implementation process
undertaken during the conversion of the AV-DLR funding to the Navy Stock Fund.
The last part of this thesis contains conclusions and recommendations developed
as a result of this study. Chapter 6, which contains these findings, lists some specific
recommendations to help implement the "ideal" management control system that was
listed in Chapter 2. The chapter ends with some suggestions for future study.
II. MANAGEMENT CONTROL THEORY
A. GENERAL
Prior to an evaluation of the Navy's management control system for the AV-
DLR funding, a theoretical management control system must be developed. This
"ideal" management control system will then be used in the following chapters to
examine the present control system. This chapter will defme management control,
examine the principles of successful control systems and evaluate how the system
relates to the military organization.
B. THE CONTROL PROCESS
What is control? The Oxford English Dictionary defines control as the power or
authority to direct and govern; a standard for comparing and testing. Peter Drucker
states that ". . . control is an ambiguous word. It means the ability to direct oneself
and one's work. It can also mean domination of one person by another" [Ref 1: p.
131]. George R. Terry states that "... controlling is determining what is being
accomplished, that is, evaluating the performance and, if necessary, applying corrective
measures so that the performance takes place according to plans" [Ref. 2: p. 535].
These definitions on control sound very much like the ones for management.
Terry suggests that the concept of controlling is synonymous with that of management.
But that it is only partially true because controlling is only a part, but an important
part, of the entire concept of management [Ref. 2: p. 535]. Terry's definition for
management is "... a distinct process consisting of planning, organizing, actuating,
and controlling, performed to determine and accomplish stated objectives by the use of
human beings and other resources" [Ref. 2: p. 4].
James Stoner [Ref. 3] has a similar definition of management where he lists
planning, organizing, leading and controlling as his four main management activities.
Koontz and O'Donneil go one step further when they identify five basic management
activities, planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling [Ref. 4].
Terry shows how controlling in the whole management process and the concept
of feedback and its relationship in controlling are related in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 shows planning, organizing and actuating directed to basic resources















Figure 2.1 Controlling and Feedback, with Relationship
to Planning, Organizing, and Actuating.
or the standard. Any difference between these two provides the feedback which
indicates the amount of correction to be made if the present plan is to be successful.
Now that control has been defined in the management environment the control system
has to be looked at. [Ref. 2: p. 539]
Anthony, Dearden, and Bedford state that a control system will have at least four
components: [Ref. 5: p. 6]
(1) An observation device that detects or observes and measures or describes the
activities or other phenomena being controlled. The term for this component
may be observer, detector, or sensor.
(2) An assessing device that evaluates the performance of an activity or
organization, usually relative to some standard or expectation of what should
beT and identifies out-of-control activities and conditions. The term for this
component is evaluator, assessor, or selector.
(3) A behavior modification device for altering or changing performance if the
need for doing so is indicated. This component mav Tbe called a director,
modifier, or effector.
(4) A means of transmitting information among the other devices. This
component's term is communication network.
The following example [Ref. 6: p. 4] demonstrates the control system described,
and uses the analogy of a thermostat to illustrate it more clearly. The thermostat has a
thermometer (detector) to measure the present temperature. It then compares that
actual measurement to the desired temperature (evaluator). The furnace is controlled
until the desired temperature is reached then turned off (effector). The information is
transmitted by electrical impulses (communication network). This is an electrical
control system and can easily be applied to a biological control system (i.e.. how the
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human body controls temperature) and even a mental control system (i.e., how a
person drives a car using his brain and sensing organs). These are "simple" control
systems. These are simple in that control of an organization as a whole is much more
complicated due to the large degree of variables.
C. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
In the previous section, control was looked at in the overall view of management
and a simple control system described. Management control has been defined a
number of ways, the following are just a few of those definitions:
(1) Mockler: Management control is a systematic effort to set performance
standards with planning objectives, to design information feedback svstems. to
compare actual performance with these predetermined standards, to 'determine
whether there are any deviations and to measure their significance, and to take
anv action required to assure that all corporate resources are being used in the
most effective and efficient way possible in achieving corporate objectives.
[Ref. 6: p. 2]
(2) Stoner: Management control is the process through which managers assure
that actual activities conform to planned activities. "{Ref. 3: p. 592]
(3) Anthony, Dearden, and Bedford: Management control is primarily a process
for motivating and inspiring people to perform organization activities that will
further the organization's goal. It is also a "process for detecting and
correcting unintentional performance errors and intentional irregularities" such
as theft or misuse of resources. [Ref. 5: p. 11]
(4) Koontz and O'Donnell: The managerial function of control is the
measurement and correction of the performance of subordinates in order to
make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised" to attain them are
accomplished. [Ref. 4: p. 639]
These definitions are all concerned with measuring, comparing and taking
corrective action. These definitions lead to a number of different control processes by
those and other authors. They all have essentially the same steps:
(1) Koontz and O'Donnell: (1) establishing standards; (2) measuring performance
against these standards; (3) correcting deviation from standards and plans
[Ref. 4: p. 640]
6 *
: (1) establish standards and methods for measuring performance; (2]
2 the performance: (3) does the performance match the standard?; (4]
(2) Mockler:
measure
take corrective action [Ref.
x
6:'p. 2]
(3) Newman: (1) define desired results* (2) establish predictors of results; (3)
establish standards for predictors and results; (4) establish the information and
feedback network; (5) evaluate information and take corrective action
[Ref. 7: pp. 12-25]
(4) Terrv: (1) measuring the performance; (2) comparing performance with the
standard and ascertaining the difference, if anv; (3) correcting unfavorable
deviation by means of remedial action [Ref. 2: p. ':>3]
Anthony, Dearden and Bedford [Ref. 5: p. 10] state that three phases to
management control process are the planning of the action, the execution of that
action and the evaluation of the action. They continue by listing these three phases of
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the process as strategic planning, management control and task control. The term
strategic planning is described as the process of deciding on goals and the development
of broad strategies in attaining these goals. Management control is the process where
management assures that the organization carries out those strategies. Task control
assures that the tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.
Mockler [Ref. 6: p. 4] states that in addition to measuring, comparing, and taking
corrective action, modern management control must also be able to create and
communicate effective standards, develop information reporting standards and take
positive action to improve operations.
Two of the three previous theses related to Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM)
Funds [Refs. 8,9] adopted the Mockler model as an "ideal" management control
process. This model will also be used in this thesis. However, as a number of authors,
Terry, Koontz, O'Donnell, Anthony, Dearden, Bedford, and Mockler [Refs. 2,4,5,6],
state, the control process may be general in nature, but it then has to be developed for
a specific area of concern. The five step model that will be used in this thesis follows:
[Ref. 9: p. 30]
(1) set performance standards consistent with the planning objectives;
(2) design the information feedback system;
(3) compare actual performance with predetermined standards;
(4) determine whether there are deviations and measure their significance;
(5) take any action required to assure that all organizational resources are being
used in the most effective and efficient way possible in achieving
organizational objectives;
This system will be used to evaluate the AV-DLR program. Although it has
been used in the two previous theses, the specific aspects to be emphasized are
different.
D. MAJOR CONTROL PRINCIPLES
Koontz and O'Donnell [Ref. 4: pp. 672-676] list major control principles that
have to be used in order to develop an effective management control system. These
principles will also be used to evaluate the present AV-DLR program in the Navy.
Following is the list of Koontz and O'Donnell' s control principles:
(1) Assurance of Objective - The task of control is to detect potential or actual
deviations from plans early enough to permit effective corrective action.
(2) Efficiency of Controls - The control techniques and approaches are efficient
when thev detect and identify the causes oi~ actual or potential deviations from
plans with a minimum of costs or other unwanted consequences.
(3) Control Responsibility - The primarv responsibility for the exercise of control
rest in the manager th'at is charged with the execution of the plan.
(4) Direct Control - The most effective technique of controj is to assure the
quality of subordinate managers. The higher the quality of managers, the less
will be the need for indirect controls.
(5) Reflection of Plans - The more specific the controls are designed to the area of
concern, the more effective they will be in dealing with the situation.
(6) Organizational Suitability - The more controls are designed to reflect the place
in the organization structure where responsibility for action lies, the more they
will help "correct deviations from plans.
(7) Individuality of Controls - Effective controls require consistency, operational
responsibility, ability to understand, and needs of the individual concerned.
Control information which a manager cannot or will not use has very little
value.
(8) Standards - Effective and efficient controls are required to be objective,
accurate, and suitable for the purpose intended.
(9) Critical-point Control - Effective control requires attention to those factors
that are critical to appraising performance against an individual plan.
(10) Exception - The more a manager concentrates his control efforts on
exceptions, the more efficient the results of his control.
(11) Flexibility of Controls - For controls to remain effective despite failure or
unforeseen changes of plans, flexibility must be in their design.
(12) Action - Control is justified onlv if deviations are corrected through
appropriate planning, organizing, staffing and directing.
Stoner also uses these principles when he talks about an effective control system.
Stoner states for a control system to be effective, it must be accurate, timely, objective,
focused on key performance areas and strategic control points, economically realistic,
organizationally realistic, coordinated with the organization's work flow, flexible,
prescriptive, and acceptable to organization members. [Ref. 3: p. 606]
E. THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
The management control system that has been described above is relevant to
either a profit or a non-profit organization. Anthony, Dearden and Bedford
[Ref. 5: pp. 745-764] discuss aspects of control that differ between profit and non-profit
organizations. Some aspects of control of specific concern in non-profit organizations
are of interest.
1. Measures
Organizations are required to use an input (resource) to produce an output
(goods and services). Efficiency is measured by the relationship between inputs and
outputs. Effectiveness is how well the outputs accomplish the objective. In a profit-
oriented organization, profit can be used to measure both effectiveness and efficiency.
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This one control tool is the most important difference between profit and non-profit
organizations [Refs. 2,3.6]. There are significant advantages to an organization that
can use the profit measure in control. First a profit measure permits a single criterion
to be evaluated for determining a course of action. Second it provides for quantitative
analysis between different proposals. Third it provides for a single broad measure of
performance. Finally it facilitates decentralization and permits comparisons of
performance among different centers.
The military organization is a non-profit organization and therefore, does not
have this control tool available. The output of service is very hard to measure as
compared to a profit organization. As a result it does not easily lend itself to be used
as a measure of performance. Even the relationship between costs and benefits are
hard to quantify in the non-profit organization. Even when outputs can be quantified
the goal of a non-profit organization is to render as much service as possible for a
given amount of resources or to use as little resources as possible for a given amount
of service. The measurement problem then lies in evaluating outputs and not in the
examination of inputs.
Anthony, Dearden. and Bedford distinguish two types of measures: results
measures and process measures. A results measure compares outputs to an
organization's objectives. This should be in measurable terms; however as previously
addressed this is not always possible for a non-profit organization, and a surrogate or
proxy measure should then be used. A results measure relates to the impact the
organization has on the outside world and the process measure to an activity carried
on by the organization. The difference between these two is that the results measure is
"ends oriented" while the process measure is "means oriented". Results measures and
process measures will be discussed in later chapters. [Ref. 5: p. 757]
2. Budgets
Budgets are formal statements of the financial resources that are set aside for
carrying out specific activities in a given time period. They establish clear and
unambiguous performance standards. At stated intervals during the given time period,
actual performance will be compared directly with the performance standards.
Deviations can quickly be detected and acted upon. These reasons make budgets a
widely used control tool. [Ref 3: p. 619]
Budgets must not be confused with forecasts or projections. A forecast is a
prediction of what will most likely happen. It does not imply that the forecaster will
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attempt to shape events so that the forecast will happen. A projection is an estimation
of what will happen if various conditions and situations should exist. A forecast is
exclusively a planning tool, while a budget is both a planning tool and a control tool.
All budgets include some forecasting in that budgetees cannot be held responsible for
certain events that affect their ability to meet budgeted objectives. The way the
manager is able to mix the planning and control aspects of a budget will determine
how effective the budget will be. [Ref. 5: pp. 443-444]
Budgets are the most widely used control tool in both profit and non-profit
organizations [Refs. 2,3,6]. The profit-oriented organization allows managers to change
budgets wThen profits will be increased. In the non-profit organization the input or
resources are normally fixed so it is very hard to change the budget. If the budgeted
expenses exceed the standard in a non-profit organization then the expenses have to be
reduced. This lack of flexibility makes the planning phase of the budget in the non-
profit organization that much more important. This fact and the lack of the "profit"
control tool makes budgeting that much more important in the non-profit oriented
organization. [Ref. 5: p. 762]
The budget is the most important control tool in the AV-DLR management
control process, and will be the primary focus of this thesis. Stoner and Terry
[Refs. 3.4: pp. 632, 633] list some advantages and disadvantages that have to be kept in
mind when using budgets as a control tool. Some advantages are:
(1) Actions are likely to be based on study and careful considerations reducing the
chance for a snap decision.
(2) Weakness in the organization, managerial ability and personnel are identical.
(3) Waste reduction is promoted.
(4) It is easier to coordinate the work of the entire organization.
(5) It helps people learn from past experience.
(6) It can serve as a means of evaluation.
Some disadvantages are:
(1) It is onlv a tool and is subject to human judgement, interpretation, and
evaluation.
(2) It can not prevent deviations from appearins;. It does not ensure satisfactory
results nor does it control automatically.
(3) Good and adequate standards are mandatory and these are sometimes difficult
to come by.
(4) Skill and experience are required to make budgetary control work.
(5) Good communication up and down the chain of command is required. The
goals have to be identified and attainable, which is not always easy to do.
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In the next chapter we will look at what role the federal budget and the Navy
budget play in the AV-DLR program.
F. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a management control process that
could be tailored for the AV-DLR program. First, control was defined. Second, a
simple control process was discussed. Third, management control was defined and an
"ideal" management control process presented. Forth, control principles that are found
in good control systems were listed. Fifth, the military organization was looked at to
identify differences between the profit and non-profit organization. This discussion led
to measures being discussed and then to the primary control tool for the non-profit
organization, the budget. The primary focus of this thesis will be on the AV-DLR
budget within the Navy.
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III. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (AV-DLR) FUNDING
A. GENERAL
AV-DLR funds are appropriated by the Federal Budget process to the United
States Navy. This process is discussed in this chapter and a number of terms and
definitions that relate to the process are identified. After the discussion of the Federal
Budget process is completed the budget process within the Navy will be described.
The use, flow, and budgeting of AV-DLR funds are presented. Different
appropriations are identified in order to better understand how the AV-DLR funding
fits into the overall Navy budget process.
B. THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS
The main purpose of the budget process is to allocate scarce resources among
competing public requirements. Budgeting is geared to a cycle which allows new





1. The Executive Formulation
The first phase consists of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting stages
of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) formulation process. It takes over two years
for the first two phases to be completed, and three years for the entire process. As a
result there are always three different fiscal year budgets active at one time.
[Ref. 10: p. A-31
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was introduced to
the DOD by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960's. The system
was "designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in making choices about the allocation
of resources among a number of competing or possible programs and alternatives to
accomplish specific objectives in our national defense" [Ref. 10: p. A-9]. The PPBS is
really the planning resources management system in the DOD. This system establishes
the framework and decision making process for future programs and also allows prior
decisions to be reviewed in regard to the current environment.
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The planning phase starts with the preparation of the Joint Strategic Planning
Document (JSPD), by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This document is used by the
Secretary of Defense to formulate the Defense Guidance (DG).
The DG provides the definitive policv. strategy. force planning, resource planning,
and fiscal guidance upon which all Defense planning and programming are based.
It also includes threat and opportunity assessments and statements of issues
requiring further study or top management attention. [Ref. 11: p. 3-2]
The planning phase ends and and the programming phase begins with the issuance of
the DG.
The basic ourpose of the programming phase in the PPBS is to translate the
strategv into program force" structures in terms of time-phased resource
requirements including personnel, monies, and matenal. This is accomplished bv
systematic approval procedures that "cost out" force objectives for financial and
manpower resources live years into the future. [Ref. 10: p. A-ll]
Based upon the DG. each of the services prepare their respective Program
Objective Memorandum(POM). The POM is an annual document in which each
Military7 Department and Defense Agency recommends and describes its total program
objectives within DOD-specified resource constraints. Program objectives are fiscally
constrained [Ref. 11: p. 3-3]. The POM provides the justification for changes from the
Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) base and is the means of submitting revision
requests to the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 10: p. A-ll]. After the POMs are submitted,
the JCS issue the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).
The JPAM provides a risk assessment based on all of the force
recommendations of the Services' POMs and includes the view of JCS on the balance
and capabilities of all the force levels [Ref. 11: p. 3-4]. The Secretary* of Defense
reviews the POMs and the JPAM and issues the Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM). The PDMs record the decisions of the Secretary- of Defense on the POMs.
The programming phase ends when the Secretary of Defense issues the PDM.
The final phase of the PPBS is Budgeting. The annual budget expresses the
financial requirements to support the programs that were approved during the
preceding phases. It is through the budget that the planning and programming are
translated into annual funding requirements [Ref. 10: p. A- 13]. A joint budget review
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the DOD is conducted and the
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results are issued in the Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The PBD is then used to
determine the President's Budget. This completes the executive formulation phase.
2. Congressional Enactment
The Congressional enactment phase starts with the submission of the
President's budget. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that the President
submit his budget to Congress in January, nine months before it goes into effect.
Congress has from January7 until October, the begining of the budget year, to decide on
authorizations and appropriations. The following two definitions are provided from
Aaron Wildavsky: [Ref. 12: p. 281]
• Authorization: Basic substantive legislation enacted by the Congress that sets,
up a federal program or agency, either indefinitelv or 'for a specified period of
time. Such legislation is a "prerequisite for the subsequent enactment of budget
authority and may set limits on the amount that can Be appropriated.
• Appropriation: An act of Congress that allows federal agencies to incur
obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes.
This is the most common form of budget authority.
Two types of appropriations that pertain to the AV-DLR process need to be
defined. The two are the expense type appropriation and the investment type
appropriation. The expense type appropriations finance ongoing operations, which in
the Navy, includes Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Military and Personnel
(MP). The investment type appropriations finance investments such as procurement
and construction, which includes Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN). [Ref. 10: A-6]
The AV-DLR funding was changed from an investment type appropriation to
an expense type appropriation in April 1985. This was a major change, as the major
claimant responsible for each type appropriation is different. These appropriations are
discussed in the next section.
The Congress hears testimony on the President's budget and bases their
decisions with respect to programs and funding levels on this information. The Navy's
ability to obtain passage of required legislation depends upon sound justification of its
requirements, which is a function of how well the Navy's position is presented. The
more documentation for a requirement the stronger the chance of it being approved.
[Ref. 10: p. A-16]
Congress agrees on and passes the Authorization Acts and then passes
corresponding Appropriation Acts, which completes the Congressional enactment
phase of the process.
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3. Budget Execution
After Congress has completed their phase and the President signs the
Appropriation Act the budget execution can begin. The implementation of the act is
done by way of an Appropriation Warrant. The warrant is issued by the Treasury
Department and stipulates the amount of the appropriation and lists any restrictions
imposed on the appropriation. The warrant then goes to the head of the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the Comptroller General of the United States, for
countersignature. This allows for both the Executive and Legislative branches to agree
on and sign the warrant. When the warrant is countersigned then the appropriated
funds are available for apportionment and allocation. Definitions for apportionment
and allocation follow: [Ref 10: p. A- 27]
• Apportionment: Is a determination made bv the Office of Management and
Budget which limits the amount of obligations or expenditures which mav be
incurred during a specified time period. It is a violation of the law to obligate
or expend more then the apportioned amount.
• Allocation: Is an authorization bv Comptroller of the Navy, making funds
available within a prescribed amount to an operating agency for the pufbose of
making allotments; i.e., the first subdivision or an apportionment.
C. THE NAVY BUDGET PROCESS
This section examines the Navy budget process and the flow of funds within the
Navy, both prior to and after the AV-DLR funding conversion to the Navy Stock
Fund.
1. Navy Budget
The Navy- budget process is examined here to determine how the funding for
the AV-DLR program is accomplished. The Department of Defense Program
Objective Memorandum, that was described previously, is developed from the POMs
submitted by each Service. The Secretary of the Navy has assigned a number of
organizations and offices responsibility for submitting the Navy's POM. They include:
(1) Department of the Navy Program and Information Center (DONPIC)
(2) Civilian Executive Assistants
(3) Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(4) Director. Office of Program Appraisal
(5) Comptroller of the Navy
In May of each year the Comptroller of the Navy issues a budget call which requires
all major claimants to submit budget requirements for operational and staff functions
(AV-DLR requirements fall into this category).
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There is a significant difference between the budget process prior to and after
the AV-DLR funding conversion to the Navy Stock Fund. Prior to the conversion, the
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) would provide the budget
request to the Comptroller of the Navy via the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
This request was submitted in two types, one for procurement, in the form of Aircraft
Procurement, Navy (APN) Funds, and the other for repair, in the form of Operations
and Maintenance, Navy (O&M.N) Funds. The APN funds would be submitted over
three years in advance (i.e., requirements submitted in May 86 are for fiscal year 1990)
and are long range forecasts. The 0&M,N funds are for just over a year away (i.e.,
requirements submitted in May 86 are for fiscal year 1988). NAVSUP received input
for AV-DLRs from the Aviation Supply Office (ASO).
The conversion to the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) requires that the end user
reimburse the stock fund when they draw AV-DLRs from it. The NSF is managed at
the NAVSUP level with any required increase to the corpus of the NSF being budgeted
by NAVSUP. However, individual AV-DLRs drawn from a Stock Point to replace
inoperable items at the operating forces level are funded by O&M.N money transferred
from the supporting Naval Air Station's Operating Budget to the NSF. This requires
that operating Budget Holders budget 0&M,N Funds to reimburse the NSF for both
the procurement of new AV-DLRs for stock and repair of inoperable carcasses.
A typical end user is a Naval Air Station, and the budget requirement and
budget process will now be described. The funding requirement that is submitted for a
particular west coast air station is determined at the Commander Naval Air Force,
U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) level [Ref. 13]. This input is sent through the
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Comptroller of the Navy. The information is then combined with
other inputs and is used to determine the current apportionment and to formulate the
Navy's POM for outyears. The documentation for these requirements is later used as
program justification for Congress, as was previously discussed in the federal budget
process.
The input that COMNAVAIRPAC submits will be evaluated along with the
other Navy requirements and incorporated into the Navy's POM. Then it will again be
reviewed before it is placed into the DOD's POM. The requirements will also be
evaluated and tested during the remainder of the PPBS process and then by Congress.
The need for proper documentation and accounting is very important if the funding
levels required are to be appropriated.
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2. Flow of Funds
After the funds are appropriated by Congress, apportionment can be
determined. The Office o[ Management and Budget apportions the AV-DLR funds on
a quarterly basis to the Secretary7 of Defense. The Secretary of Defense then provides
an apportionment to the Secretary of the Navy. The funds are then allocated to the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The CNO Comptroller (OP-92) is the Responsible
Office for these funds. At this point is where the change occurs to the funding process.
Prior to the conversion the funds were in the form of APN money and suballoted by
the CNO comptroller to the Chief of Naval Material (NAVMAT). From NAVMAT
the funds were provided to NAVSUP in the form of a suballotment. NAVSUP then
issued Operating Budgets, Technical Operating Budgets to ASO for the funds. The How
of funds from Congress to ASO is shown in Figure 3.1. [Ref 10: p. G-15]
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Figure 3.1 Flow of Navy Funds (prior to conversion).
23
Subsequent to the conversion, the funds are issued to the operating forces in the form
of 0&M,N money. The funds to purchase AV-DLRs are part of the Fleet
Commander's O&M.N allotments received from CNO. COMNAVAIRPAC receives
an expense limitation from CINCPACFLT, the Fleet Commander, and then provides
the Naval Air Station (NAS) with an operating budget. The operating budget makes
the NAS a responsibility center for these funds. The flow of funds from Congress to
the NAS is shown in Figure 3.2. [Ref. 10: p. A-2S]
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Figure 3.2 Flow of Navy Funds (after conversion).
As a responsibility center the Base Commander falls under section 1517 of 31 USCA.
What this means to the Commander follows: [Ref. 10: p. A-2S]
(1) It prohibits him from makins or authorizina an obligation in excess of the
amount available in an appropriation or subdivision thereof or in excess of the
amount permitted by agency regulations.
(2) Requires that the person who violates (1), be subjected to discipline which
mav include suspension without pay, removal from office, a fine up to S5.000
and imprisonment for two years.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter provided a broad overview of the Budgeting process that results in
the approval and allocation of AV-DLR funds. First, the Federal Budget Process was
examined. The three phases (1) Executive formulation, (2) Congressional enactment,
and (3) Budget execution were discussed. Second, the Navy Process was described
where the Navy budget formulation and then the flow of funds within the Navy was
presented. Third, the different appropriations, expense and investment, were identified.
This information will aid to the understanding of the problems that will be addressed in
the remaining chapters of the thesis.
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IV. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE HISTORY
A. GENERAL
The last chapter depicted the budget process for AV-DLRs and described
different types of appropriations in general terms. This chapter will take a closer look
at the appropriations. AV-DLRs will be defined in specific terms and the evolution of
the AV-DLR process will be examined until funding was converted to the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF). The problems that the system encountered and which problems were
targeted to be corrected by the funding conversion will also be addressed in this
chapter. The chapter will end up with a discussion on the NSF. The information for
this chapter was obtained primarily from interviews and instructions.
B. BACKGROUND
What are Aviation Depot Level Repairables? They are secondary items that are
repaired at the depot level for aviation units. There are also Depot Level Repairables
(DLRs) that are secondary items for the surface and subsurface units. The AV-DLRs
are managed by the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), while the DLRs are managed by
the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC). The AV-DLRs are the primary concern of^
this thesis. However, there will be references made to the DLR program. To be more
specific AV-DLRs are separated into groups, and each group is assigned a specific
"cognizance (cog) symbol". The item management and ownership is identified by the
cog symbol.
These different groups are the responsibility of a certain organization and the
funding for these parts come from different appropriations. Figure 4.1 shows the
aviation depot level universe prior to incorporating them into the Navy Stock Fund.
[Ref 14: p. 11-7]
The funding for all o[ these items were accomplished by investment type
appropriations. They include Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN), Weapons
Procurement, Navy (WPN) and Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) which are all
procurement appropriations. As procurement appropriations they are fully funded
three year appropriations. The appropriations have a three year obligational
availability and have funds appropriated to fully construct a specific number of units.
This requires range forecasts as opposed to current year appropriations that are only
available for obligation for one year. [Ref. 10: p. A-6]
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Cog Description Approp Procured
By
2R Aeronautical Material of a
Depot Level Repairable Nature
(Excluding Target/Drone Components)
APN ASO
2R Components and Assemblies in
Support of Aerial Targets, Drones
WPN ASO
SR Major Aeronautical Systems APN NAVAIR
4R Components and Assemblies in
Support of Shipboard Launching
ana Arresting sear, Visual Landing
Aids, and Jef Blast Deflectors
OPN ASO
6R End Items of Ground Support
Equipment
APN ASO
8N Peculiar Parts. Components or
Assemblies in Support of Training
Devices
APN ASO
4Z Aircraft Suspendable. Releasable
or Ejectable Material
APN ASO
6K Photoeraphic. Meteorological and
Reuseable Containers
APN ASO
Figure 4.1 Aviation Depot Level Repairable Universe.
In May of 1979 the CNO directed the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) to initiate
a study to determine the minimum unit price, and minimum annual demand, where it
would be uneconomical to repair a given item at the depot level. Items that were
found to be below this minimum were' designated as consumables or field level
repairables. The dollar range for this cutoff was between five hundred and one
thousand dollars. These items were removed from the depot level repairable category.
The average cost for an AV-DLR is in the area of three thousand eighty dollars
[Ref. 13].
C. ACCOUNTABILITY
How were these high value items managed prior to the conversion of AV-DLR
funding to the Navy Stock Fund? The process is described for a five thousand dollar
aircraft radio. A squadron at a Naval Air Station (NAS) that has an Aircraft
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Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) and is also a Stock Point for the piece
of AV-DLR equipment (i.e., the radio) is looked at. The AIMD is a repair facility that
can not do depot level work. The Stock Point is a place that is designated by ASO to
hold AV-DLRs in inventory until they are required.
The squadron took the broken aircraft radio to the AIMD. If the AIMD had a
radio in stock that worked, designated Ready For Issue (RFI), they would issue it to
the squadron and take the broken one. The squadron would not have been charged
anything for the five thousand dollar radio. The radio that was issued was purchased
by ASO with APN money and held in a Appropriation Purchase Account (APA).
AIMD would then try to repair the broken radio using O&M.N money for both parts
and labor. If the AIMD could not fix the radio it would have then been sent to a
Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) for repair. The transportation of the broken radio
to the DOP and the funding for the DOP and any parts came from 0&M,N money.
The fixed radio was then be sent back to the Stock Point and held in inventory. If this
radio could not be repaired then a new radio was purchased with APN money. During
the process, the Squadron, the real end user, was not charged anything for this radio.
This process was considered a "free issue" to the squadron. The cost to AIMD
was only for the parts and labor to fix the old radio not for the cost of the new radio,
an RFI unit. The cost for the repair of the old radio was funded by O&M.N money as
a mission funded responsibility. When the RFI unit was issued by the stock point, a
"complete" radio was required to be turned into AIMD or the DOP. A "complete"
radio was one that had all the parts and circuit boards inplace, even though it did not
work. This requirement to turn-in a radio was not always followed. If the radio was
obtained by the squadron during a high tempo of operations, the old radio was not
always available. The squadrons sometimes requested a new radio while they were
taking the old radio out of the aircraft. There was no tracking system to follow up and
see that the old radio was returned. When a radio was not returned, ASO paid the
5,000 dollars and the inventory' was reduced by one radio. The process was described
for just one line item; there are 54,000 line items in the AV-DLR system. The
potential for "leaks" from the system was significant.
D. PROBLEMS IN THE AV-DLR PROCESS
The "free issue" environment gave no incentive to the squadron to effectively
trouble shoot their equipment. If the equipment did not work, the squadron could just
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pull it from the aircraft and send it to AIMD. IfAIMD had a piece of equipment, the
squadron could install the new piece of equipment with no cost incurred. The same
lack of incentive was present at AIMD. If AIMD was busy, they could just send the
gear to the DOP. In fact, this was probably cheaper to AIMD as they did not have to
spend any money trying to repair the item. This "free issue" problem lacked
management incentives and was targeted for correction.
The lack of a tracking system for inoperable equipment which had not been
turned-in also created a big problem. Squadrons stock piled equipment that ASO did
not know existed. This non-RFI equipment was not being returned, therefore not
being repaired, thus depleting the inventor}'.
There was also a problem with funding that needed to be corrected. APN money
was used to purchase the equipment and then 0&M,N money was used for repair and
transportation. The APN money, being investment type appropriations, had a three
year lead time which created problems with forecasting. The 0&M,N money was from
a completely separate one-year appropriation. Subsection 1301 of the 31 USCA states:
Except as otherwise provided by law sums appropriated for various branches of
expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which
they are respectively made, and for no others.
The Navy did not have the flexibility to move the money from one appropriation to
the other without getting approval from Congress. This often was a very time
consuming process.
E. NEED FOR CHANGE
The problems just identified caused concern and brought inquiries to the Navy
from both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the General Accounting
Office (GAO). These inquiries led the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to direct that a
study be done to evaluate alternative funding mechanisms for DLRs. in May 197S.
This study considered three alternatives:
(1) Funding the procurement and repair of DLRs in a single appropriation.
(2) Funding the procurement and repair of DLRs within the existing procurement
appropriations.
(3) Funding the procurement and repair of DLRs in the Navy Stock Fund.
The study concluded that the Navy Stock Fund was the best funding vehicle to
use for the procurement and depot level repair of the DLRs. The following reasons
were given: [Ref. 14: p. 1-2]
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(1) Improved supply svstem discipline resulting from the buyer-seller relationship
inherent in a stock 'funded environment instead of the "free issue" procedure.
(2) Improved financial flexibilitv, due to the abilitv to trade-off procurement and
repair during budget execution.
(3) Improved budget forecasting due to shorter stock fund budget lead times.
(4) Improved material support responsiveness due to the stock fund's ability to
respond to emergent requirements without the need for reprograming action.
This decision led the CNO, in May 1979. to direct that a prototype program be
implemented to test the stock funding of DLRs. In April 1981, the non-aviation DLRs
were capitalized into the Navy Stock Fund by SPCC. A test period of two and one-
half years was setup to evaluate the program prior to converting AV-DLRs. A
preliminary evaluation, in 1982, was so favorable on the conversion by SPCC oC its
DLRs, that in December 1982 the CNO directed that the AV-DLRs be converted to
the NSF as well. [Ref. 14: p. 1-3]
F. NAVY STOCK FUND
To better understand the reason why the NSF was selected as the financial
vehicle for the funding of the AV-DLRs, an explanation on the NSF is presented. The
NSF is the oldest of all the DOD Stock Funds. It was established in 1893 by the Navy
Supply Act. It is a revolving fund that Finances inventory and is reimbursed by
customers when they draw on the inventory. In this regard it is a working capital fund
and the items are held at the stock point until required. The concept of a stock fund is
that once it is setup, the customers will then maintain it with their funds. The goal of
this type of fund is to cover all costs and work to a zero profit. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) controls the stock fund operations through the
apportionment process. OMB issues obligational authority to the stock fund and is
not restricted on a quarterly basis as appropriations are. The stock fund manager is
also authorized to convert commitment authority, which is an apportioned amount of^
flexibility in allocating funds, if the demand warrants it. The Navy Stock Fund
manager is the Commander, Naval Supply System Command (NAVSUP), who
delegates the responsibility for the aviation parts to ASO. the Budget Project Manager
for the AV-DLRs. NAVSUP does issue the money on a quarterly basis, but can issue
more to ASO without having to go to Congress.
This type of fund allows the Navy to divert money as it sees fit, without having
to go through the reprogramming process. The forecasting for the budget is
accomplished annually with continuous refinement and allows for greater accuracy
than did the three year budget forecasts for the APN appropriations. The NSF allows
the managers to manage the money without having to go to Congress when problems
arise. This description supports the choice by the Study Group to use the NSF to
correct most of the problems with the AV-DLR process.
G. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the AV-DLR process and identify
problems with that process prior to the conversion to the Navy Stock Fund. First.
AV-DLRs were defined and specific examples for the different categories of AV-DLRs
were presented. Second, the exchange process for a given piece of equipment was
shown. This included the accountability, or lack of it. that was provided in the AV-
DLR process. Third, the problems associated with this process were listed, which
resulted in the studies conducted to correct these problems. The recommendation to
convert to the NSF was examined. Fourth, a description of the NSF was presented.
The benefits listed, supported the recommended conversion to the NSF. The next
chapter will look at the implementation process that was undertaken in converting the
AV-DLR fundina to the Navy Stock Fund.
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V. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE IMPLEMENTATION
PROCESS
A. GENERAL
The last chapter presented the history of the AV-DLR process and indicated the
need for change. This chapter will look at the change that was implemented. The
change in funding requirements and accountability will be discussed. The personnel
hired to support the new program will be presented. Then the measures that are being
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the system will be listed. The information in this
chapter will provide the basis for the conclusions and recommendations that will follow
in the next chapter.
B. BACKGROUND
As was stated in the last chapter, the CNO directed that the AV-DLRs be
converted to the NSF. A target date of 1 April 1985 was established for the
conversion. The AV-DLR items were reviewed to see which ones would fit into the
stock, funding format and which ones should be transferred to end-use (EU) funding
and ownership. [Ref. 15: Enc. 6, p. 1]
The following criteria was used to determine if an item should fall into the EL*
category:
(1) There is a clearly defined program for the installation of end items.
(2) Future requirements are based on known program data, not demand.
(3) Replacement of end items is controlled and will occur only when upgrading or
refurbishing or due to unexpected damage.
(4) End items do not have a next higher assembly.
(5) The only procurements, other than to support planned program requirements,
are those required for insurance purposes.
Items with these characteristics are funded primarily on how they relate to specific
programs rather then on customer usage. Those items are not compatible with NSF
procedures and therefore they were not converted to the AV-DLR cog. [Ref. 14: p.
12-1]
The 2R and 8R cogs that were listed in Figure 4.1 were converted to a AV-DLR
cog family that is funded by the NSF. This new cog family was listed as 7R and




On 1 April 1985, the newly formed 7R cog family was placed in the NSF.
This required that the funding programmed in POM -85 for the procurement and
operating appropriations of these items be decremented and the funds reprogrammed
to customer accounts in the form of O&M.N funds. Now when AV-DLRs are
requisitioned, customer funds will be obligated because of the NSF revolving fund
criteria. This money was reprogrammed to the Flying Hour Program (FHP) Operation
and Maintenance, Navy funds. These funds are divided into Aircraft Flight Operations
(AFO) money and Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) money. The funds for the
AV-DLRs falls into the AOM money. To indicate the magnitude of this conversion of
funds, the 19S6 fiscal year AFO costs for Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) to be
consumed in the operations of all naval aircraft wras 689.275 million dollars: the 1986
fiscal year budget for AV-DLR costs was 985.261 million dollars [Ref. 13]. The AOM
money had been primarily for Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) funds. Now the
reprogrammed AV-DLR money was included in AOM money. Figure 5.1 indicates the
breakdown from the Secretary of the Navy to Nas Moffett Field for fiscal year 19S6
AOM funds.
AFM AVDLR TOTAL
Secretary of the Navy 535.4 M 985.3 M 1520.7 M
Commander Naval Air Force
L.S. Pacific Fleet
290.S M 511.7 M 802.5 M
NAS Moffett Field 9.2 M 18.6 M 27.8 M
Figure 5.1 AOM Funds, FYS6 Breakdown (millions of dollars).
This money was granted to NAS Moffett Field as an Operating Budget and
was a major increase to their total AOM money. As was stated in Chapter 3 this
budget carries with it Section 1517 responsibilities. The NAS could issue the money to
the individual squadrons under their command in the form of an operating target
(OPTAR). An OPTAR does not carry Section 1517 responsibilities with it.
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There are a number of problems with using an OPTAR that will be addressed.
A squadron only draws an OPTAR from the Naval Air Station while they are at the
NAS. When a squadron deploys, any money that is left in their OPTAR is returned to
the NAS and is reissued to the squadron that is returning from deployment (there is
normally a constant number of squadrons that are supported by an air station). The
requirements for each squadron would be different and the OPTARs would have to be
adjusted accordingly. Some variables that would have to be considered are:
(1) The age of the aircraft - the older they are. the higher the costs would be;
(2) Rate of flying - the higher the operational tempo, the higher the costs;
(3) Tvpe of living - the ratio of operational flights to training flights, where the
higher number of operational flights would produce higher costs;
(4) Operational delav - heaw operations could influence AV-DLR costs in future
months as well as the present one;
At the present time, the NAS does not issue the AV-DLR money in the form of an
OPTAR at the squadron level. This decision will be discussed in more detail in the
next chapter.
2. Price Structure
A price structure charging the customer for the AV-DLRs had to be
implemented to recover the costs to the NSF. A tracking system to ensure that
"complete" non-RFI AV-DLRs are returned promptly also had to be implemented. A
system was established that would handle both requirements.
The first requirement was to establish a procedure to ensure that the non-RFI
AV-DLR units, these units were termed carcasses, could be tracked effectively. This
"enhanced" carcass tracking system was to be in operation prior to the 1 April 1985,
AV-DLR conversion date. When SPCC converted their DLRs to the NSF, they
developed a carcass tracking procedure. This procedure only tracked the carcass to the
first receipt Transaction Item Reporting (TIR) activity, not to the final Designated
Support Point (DSP) or to the Designated Overhaul Point (DOP). This limitation was
recognized and the need to track the item to the final DSP or DOP was incorporated
into the AV-DLR system. [Ref. 16: p. 5-1]
An incentive to return a carcass promptly was introduced by the price charged
when an item was drawn from the NSF. A two price system was established, requiring
the customer to pay a Standard Price or a Net Price as defined below:
(1) Standard Price (Procurement Price 4- NSF Surcharge 4- DOD Price
Stabilization Factor) Obligated bv the user and billed bv the wholesale
manager when a non-RFI unit is not to be turned in.
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(2) Net Price (Repair Price + Depot Washout + NSF Surcharge + DOD Price
Stabilization Factor) Obligated bv the user when an non-RFT unit is beins or
intended to be. turned in*bv the 'customer. The "complete" non-RFI carcass
has to be returned to the DOP.
Any activity which fails to turn-in the carcass after 96 days will be billed for the
differential price between net and standard. These prices are determined by ASO and
they have to recover all the expenses to. the NSF. which include the cost of
procurement, repair, transportation, and loss of the items. The Net Price is around
sixty percent less then the Standard Price, so the incentive to return the items is now
there.
The new AV-DLR process can be examined again using the five thousand
dollar radio. Since that was the purchase price, ASO might set the Standard Price at
six thousand dollars and the Net Price at twenty-four hundred dollars. The squadron
turns in the broken radio and draws an RFI unit from AIMD. This unit came from
AIMD's inventor}' so there is no charge to the squadron. Again. AIMD trys to repair
the broken radio, carcass. If AIMD is able to fix the radio, then the radio will be
placed back into the inventory and there is no charge from the NSF. The cost of
repair to the squadron and AIMD is the same as it was prior to the conversion. The
change comes into play when a carcass is determined to be Beyond Capability of
Maintenance (BCM) by the AIMD. At this point the AIMD will draw an RFI unit
from the Stock Point and will send in the non-RFI unit to the DOP. The AIMD will
be charged the 2400 dollar net price. If the DOP does not receive a "complete" carcass
within 75 days of when the RFI unit was issued it sends out a follow-up request. The
AIMD then has 21 days to respond and if the unit is not delivered, the Standard Price
will then be charged (i.e.. the 6000 dollars).
This carcass tracking system has not been in place very long and the heavy
demand on the system has created problems with the accountability of the program. A
recent review of over 5000 items that were BCM and sent to a DOP. less then half had
the paperwork for the accountability completely correct. That means that over 2500
items could be charged at the standard price if the paperwork can not be corrected.
[Ref. 17]
3. Personnel
This program not only changed the funding process but also called for an
efficient and effective carcass tracking program. An increase in manpower was
required to run this program properly. The Navy's manpower requirements come from
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the Ships Manpower Documentation (SMD) system, the Squadrons Manpower
Documentation (SQMD) system, and the Shore Requirements, Standards, and
Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS). The SMD and the SQMD evaluate
current work load, therefore new billets can only be added after they are justified. The
SHORSTAMPS evaluates work load tasking and can authorize additional billets to
meet the increase required by this change. [Ref. 14: p. 8-1]
The Major Claimants requested 253 personnel and 17 were not recommended.
This number includes all personnel hired to implement the new carcass tracking system.
Only 145 were hired in fiscal year 19S5, when the carcass tracking system was to have
been fully implemented and running effectively. This was a relatively small number o[
personnel to organize and implement the accounting of over 54,000 line items and the
implementation of a new carcass tracking system where there previously was none.
4. Measurements
A measurement system was identified to measure the effectiveness of
converting the AV-DLR funding to the Navy Stock Fund format. This system was
designed to measure the supply effectiveness in providing improved AV-DLR
availability while minimizing the effect of outside influences. To do this a baseline of
data had to be established prior to the conversion date. Data was collected from April
1984 and will continue to be collected until April 1987. The measurement tools
identified for this evaluation and how they relate to the process follow. [Ref. 14: p.
9-3]
a. System Material Availability (SMA)
The SMA indicates the percentage of requisitions that are filled for an item
from anywhere in the supply system. The item may not be at the local stock point, but
an RFI unit is available for issue. As carcasses are properly returned to the DOP, the
availability of RFI units within the system should go up.
b. Demand and Requisition Frequency
This information can be obtained by examining the Recurring Demand
(RD), the recurring Requisition Frequency (RF), and Non- Recurring Demand (NRD).
This information will indicate how the demand, by the end user, might be affected with
the loss of the "free issue" procedures that had previously existed.
c. Carcass Return and Survival Rates
This information will be provided by the Carcass Return Rate (CRR) and
the Survival Rates (SR) and is provided in both units and dollar weights. These rates
will again provide information of a recurring nature for the items.
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d. Procurement Lead Times and Repair Turnaround Time
The Procurement Lead Time (PLT) and the Repair Turnaround Time
(RTAT) need to be analyzed. These items influence the supply system effectiveness
and could cause misleading results if they change significantly during the evaluation
process.
e. Level of Repair Execution
This is another measure that has to be considered when looking at the
overall effectiveness of the supply system. The amount of money that ASO has to
spend on repairs is also critical. If ASO is operating at Level Four, which means that
all requirements are fully funded, then the effectiveness of the supply system should be
very high. Comparing the system after conversion to a period where ASO was in Level
Four could also have misleading results.
/. Average Days Delay
This information is provided in the Average Days Delay for Delayed
Requisitions (ADDDR) Reports. As the number of carcasses are returned to the
system this number should go down, increasing the effectiveness of the supply system.
g. Response Time for NMCSjPMCS Requisitions
High priority items, that are not available from Supply, affect the
operational effectiveness of a squadron. These items impact on readiness, and are
placed in two categories:
(1) Not Mission Capable - Supply (NMCS)
(2) Partial Mission Capable - Supply (PMCS)
One of the reasons stated for this conversion was to obtain higher readiness, as the
delay in the response times to these requisitions goes down, readiness will go up.
h. Subsystem Capability Impact Reporting (SCIR)
This measure provides more detailed information than the last section, as it
provides information in a number of categories. These categories include Fully
Mission Capable (FMC), Mission Capable (MC), Partial Mission Capable Supply
(PMCS), Partial Mission Capable Maintenance (PMCM). Not Mission Capable
Supply (NMCS). and Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM). This measure
gives a better picture on readiness and to what degree supply plays in the problem.
I. Cannibalization Rates
This number indicates the amount of working parts that are moved from
one aircraft in order to fix another aircraft. If one aircraft is ready to fly and a radio
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brakes, a working radio will be removed from another aircraft if an RFI unit is not
available at AIMD or the stock point. Cannibalization should be a last resort for the
squadron and a high rate would indicate an ineffective supply system.
j. Awaiting Parts (AWP) Rates at AIMDs
AIMDs try to repair the AV-DLRs when the units are turned in by the
squadron. They will work on items which might require a part in order for it to be
fixed. With the higher cost to the AIMD to send the item to the DOP, they may now
hold items longer to fix them. It is a lot cheaper to pay 100 dollars for a part and wait
one month, then to pay 2400 dollars to get an RFI unit in two weeks. The trade off is
that an RFI unit is out of the inventory for two extra weeks.
k. Retrograde Time
The amount of time that it takes from submission of a requisition for an
item and when the carcass actually arrives at the DOP. There had not been any type
of carcass tracking system prior to 1981, so this measure is relatively new.
/. Summary of Measurements
The measures that have just been discussed were all in existance prior to
the conversion date. The goals of these measures were to determine the effectiveness
of the conversion of the AV-DLR funding to the NSF. Of the four stated objectives,
these measurements only apply to one. That objective was to improve material
support responsiveness due to the stock fund's ability to respond to emergent
requirements without the need for reprogramming action.
Three of the measures captured "readiness". These measures are the
NMCS, PMCS, and the SCIR and they are very close to a true measure of fleet
aircraft readiness. The demand and requisition frequency measures will indicate a
change in the end user utilization if there is one. There are two measures that will
indicate any changes to outside factors that must be considered when evaluating the
effectiveness of the conversion. These measures are the level of repair execution and
procurement lead times. If the effectiveness of the system indicates improvement,
however ASO has gone from level one to level four in funding, the increase in
effectiveness may not be a result of the conversion.
The remaining eight measures all capture the "effectiveness" of the system
and will answer the question if the conversion has met that one objective. Not one of
the measures really indicates the efficiency of the system. There also were no new
measures developed to evaluate the conversion.
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D. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the implementation process of
converting the funding of AV-DLRs to the Navy Stock Fund. First, the background
on how items were identified for inclusion in the 7R cog family, which is made up of
the AV-DLR items. Second, the magnitude of the funding conversion was shown.
The impact to the funding level at the Naval Air Station on AOM funds was discussed.
Third, the implementation of the AV-DLR process was examined. The two price
structure, the net price and standard price, that was used to correct the previous "free
issue" theory7 was presented. Fourth, the extra personnel that were added to implement
the program were addressed. Fifth, the measures that were identified to determine the
effectiveness on the supply system by the conversion of the AV-DLR funding to the
NSF were listed. The following chapter will examine the overall process and evaluate
the measures that are beins used to assess the svstem.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the conversion of the AV-DLR funding to
the Navy Stock Fund. The preceding chapters have laid the foundation on which
conclusions and sound recommendations can be formulated. Conclusions are drawn
from the items that have already been addressed. Based on these conclusions
recommendations for these same areas are presented. The recommendations should
result in an increase in the effective and efficient utilization of limited resources in
obtaining higher fleet readiness. As with any dynamic situation, suggestions for future
study are listed.
B. OLD AV-DLR SYSTEM
There were a number of problems associated with the AV-DLR program prior to
the conversion of the funding to the Navy Stock Fund. These problems are addressed
along with conclusions and recommendations.
1. Control Principles
The AV-DLR program lacked some of Koontz and O'Donnell's control
principles. One principle, described in Chapter 2 as the Control Principle, stated that
the primary responsibility for the exercise of control rests with the manager that is
charged with the execution of the plan. ASO was paying for the AV-DLRs that
squadrons were using and that AIMDs were repairing. When the squadrons or
AIMDs were inefficient, ASO had to pay for it. ASO had little control over the end
user and any action taken could have a major impact on readiness and might not affect
the squadron or A1MD that created the problem.
This was not a very sound management practice and would create
inefficiencies in the total system. The new procedure will enhance the end user
responsibility on the AV-DLR process. This is a desirable affect in a superior
management system. It is therefore recommended that the responsibility be placed at
the lowest level where the manager has control of the process and the benefits are
greater then the costs.
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2. Flexibility of Control
The Flexibility of Control, which states that for controls to remain effective,
despite failure or unforeseen changes of pians. flexibility must be in their design, is
another Koontz and O'Donnell principle that was lacking. The ridged budget structure,
where procurement money was in APN dollars and repair money was in O&M.N
dollars, did not allow ASO or the Navy in general to have that flexibility. In the past
ASO was given the money to procure and repair AV-DLRs. The limiting factor was
the amount of procurement money appropriated (i.e.. APN funds). The repair money
which was appropriated (i.e., O&M.N funds), could be moved around within the Navy
without obtaining Congressional approval for reprogrammmg.
The Navy's flexibility was encumbered when they needed to move funds from
the APN account to the O&M.N account because Congressional approval is
mandated. The same was true if funds had to be diverted from the O&M.N account to
the APN account. Therefore the consolidation of the procurement dollars and the
repair dollars to a single fund is a very desirable objective. To correct this lack of
flexibility with the funds, the NSF conversion was the appropriate choice.
3. Turn-in Accountability
The lack of turn-in accountability for carcasses was one of the biggest causes
of inefficiency in the system. If an item was not turned-in at the time of issue of the
RFI unit, there were no procedures established that would follow up to ensure that the
items were returned. There was no real incentive for the squadrons to return carcasses
to the system, which caused non-RFI parts to remain in squadrons. Instead of being
repaired and placed in an RFI condition the non-RFI AV-DLRs. that were not turned
in, depleted the inventory at the stock points and AIMDs. The real limiting factor
affecting overall readiness is the number of RFI parts that are available in the system.
To increase the availability of RFI units in the system a carcass tracking
system had to be implemented. A carcass tracking system requiring accountability
from the end user to the DOP is recommended.
4. Measures and Standards
Prior to conversion to the NSF there were no specific performance standards
established for AV-DLRs at the squadron or AIMD level. The "free issue'' concept at
the end user level had a negative affect on ASO's ability to maintain an effective and
efficient AV-DLR. program.
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It was mentioned earlier that in a non-profit organization it is not always
possible to measure output and that it might be appropriate to measure an input such
as cost. The cost can then be used in determining how effective and efficient an
organization is. For this reason, the budget has played a critical role in the non-profit
organization such as the military. The AV-DLR process was based on this policy.
Each year money was allocated to the AV-DLR program based on historical data.
One of the major inputs to the annual requirement was determined by the number of
flight hours forecasted. As flight hours went up the AV-DLR costs would go up. The
effectiveness or the efficiency with which this money was spent was not really
measured.
The use of cost as a measure was one option listed, however a number of
surrogate measures can be used. This system did have a number of surrogate measures
that required an immense amount of paperwork. The measures that were listed in
Chapter 5 to determine the effectiveness of the AV-DLR conversion process were all in
place prior to the funding change. The SMA, the ADDDR, the NMCS, the PMCS,
the SCIR, the RTAT. the canmbalization rates, the AWP rates at AIMDs and the
retrograde times provide managers with a lot of information. This information does
not indicate how efficient the system is. The more money that is placed into the
system, the higher the numbers or ratios would be. thus indicating an efficient system.
Managers did not have specific performance standards set that would encourage the
system be operated in an efficient manner or to determine actual performance results.
If standards were set, they would only be valid at a given funding level, because as
funding levels were increased the standards would have to be raised to maintain the
same level of effectiveness and efficiency.
The desired output from an effective and efficient AV-DLR program is high
fleet readiness [Refs. 14.15]. The measures that have been listed primarily try to
determine readiness. The results from these measures could indicate a very high level
of readiness while the AV-DLR process is very inefficient. The opposite could also be
true, where readiness is low, but the AV-DLR process is very efficient. Readiness, as
an output measure, is too far removed from the AV-DLR process to be useful as a
specific measure.
5. Management Control Process
The squadron manager, the AIMD manager and the NAS manager were not
concerned with a management control system prior to the conversion of the AV-DLRs
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to the NSF. The squadrons required the parts and ASO provided the funds, if the
squadron was inefficient it did not impact them. This procedure led to the "free issue"
policy that was described previously and caused inefficiencies in the system. The
managers were not responsible for any AV-DLR funds, so they were not concerned
with their performance with regard to AV-DLRs. For this reason a management
control process was never developed for the AV-DLR system. Without concern by
managers, an efficient management control process would not have been developed.
The AV-DLR funding conversion to the NSF places that concern directly on the AV-
DLR managers. Recommendations for improvement to the management control
process is discussed under the new AV-DLR system.
6. Summary of Old AV-DLR System Recommendations
The conversion of the AV-DLR fund to the Navy Stock Fund was an
appropriate decision. The control responsibility was placed on the manager charged
with the execution of the plan. The flexibility of control was enhanced by the funding
being placed completely in a revolving stock, fund managed at a headquarters level.
The managers can now move money from repair to procurement or from procurement
to repair depending on the needs of the Navy. This allows funds to be reprogrammed
without having to go through Congresss. This was a significant improvement to the
system and allowed the managers greater flexibility to optimize their resources.
C. NEW AV-DLR SYSTEM CONCLUSIONS
1. Accountability
Now that the AV-DLRs are funded by the NSF and the end user is being
charged for the items, cost is again an important measure. However, there are two
areas that should be of concern. First, how often a particular squadron is charged for
AV-DLR items. A squadron is only charged for items that are not turned in as
"complete". The squadrons are normally co-located at a Naval Air Station that has an
AIMD. When an AV-DLR breaks at the squadron level, it should immediately be
turned-in to the AIMD. This quick turn-in process and the fact that the squadron is
so close to the AIMD allows for tight control of the AV-DLR carcasses. An effective
and efficient manager should never be charged for an AV-DLR unit because they only
exchange broken units for RFI units. The squadrons are not issued new units from the
AIMD.
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This procedure may still seem like a "free issue" for the squadron but another
measure should be considered. When an AV-DLR is returned to the AIMD. the unit
is examined. If the unit works properly or only requires a minor correction, one that
the squadron should have performed, the item is returned to the inventory7 in an RFI
condition. The discrepancy is signed off as A-799. This "A-799 sign-off' indicates that
nothing can be found wrong with the gear. This situation causes inefficiencies in the
system that should reflect on the squadron manager that turned in the unit. The
incentive for squadrons to closely trouble shoot problems will be increased if the A-799
sign-offs are used as a control measure.
2. Price Structure
The net price and standard price structure that AIMD is charged for turned in
AV-DLRs provides the incentive to return "complete" carcasses to the DOP. The
manager's effectiveness can be measured by how many items are charged at the
standard price. Items that are lost or not turned in create leakages in the system which
lead to inefficiencies. The RFI units are drawn for inoperative units and therefore
should always be charged at the net price. The review that was conducted on the AV-
DLRs and reported in the previous chapter, indicates that there is a significant
problem with the carcass tracking system. The documentation on over half of the
items turned in are not complete and can cause excessive standard prices to be charged.
This induces a large error into the data for the evaluation on the effectiveness of the
AV-DLR funding conversion to the NSF. This error will not be detected with the
present control measures.
3. Carcass Tracking
The planned start date to implement carcass tracking for AV-DLRs was
November 19S4 [Ref. 18: App. A, p. 1]. This applied to over 54,000 line items and
only 145 personnel were hired Navy wide in Fiscal year 1985 for this process. This
system was to be fully operational prior to the planned conversion date o^ April 1,
1985. The successful implementation of this carcass tracking system was not
determined prior to that date [Ref. 13]. The initial results of the reviewed items
indicate that the carcass tracking system still has significant problems [Ref. 17]. Until
this system can be successfully implemented, no determination on the effectiveness of
the AV-DLR funding conversion should be reached.
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4. Control Process
In Chapter 2 a five step model for the "ideal" management control process was
developed. To review that model, the five steps were:
(1) set performance standards consistent with the planning objectives;
(2) design the information feedback system:
(3) compare the actual performance with the predetermined standards:
(4) determine whether there are deviations and measure their significance;
(5) take anv action required to assure that all organizational resources are being
used in the most effective and efficient way possible in achieving
organizational objectives;
Now the need for a management control process for the squadron manager
and the AIMD manager is clear. The NAS commander wants to maximize readiness
for all the squadrons assigned. The budget is used to establish goals and objectives for
the NAS to meet. The NAS has a minor input to the budget submission as the main
input comes from COMNAVAIRPAC for the west coast Air Stations [Ref. 13]. When
the planning objectives are set the performance standards can be established to obtain
those objectives. Both efficient and effective standards must be set. The feedback
system has to be developed, with actual performance evaluated. Deviations can be
measured and corrected. The management control model can easily be applied to this
system to improve the AV-DLR process within the Navy. The problems encountered
with the budget in fiscal year 1986 for AV-DLR funding can be attributed to a number
of reasons. The most important factor was the increase in the standard price charges
for the AV-DLRs because of the carcass tracking procedure inefficiencies. As a result
of the uncertainty of the charges, both the Commanders of the Naval Air Forces
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets removed the Section 1517 responsibilities from the Naval
Air Stations for the 1986 fiscal year. This allowed managers to fully fund their
requirements and not impact readiness. Until the problems with the carcass tracking
system are corrected, the budget will be ineffective as a control tool.
D. NEW AV-DLR SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Squadron Accountability
High readiness is the stated objective for the AV-DLR process. The current
measures look at readiness in a very general way. The measures can be misleading and
specific measures have to be developed to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of
the process. This should start at the squadron level, where the number of times a
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charge is imposed for the lack of a AV-DLR turn-in and the number of A-799 sign-offs
are recorded and used as specific measures against a squadron. In previous theses
[Refs. 8.9,19] it was recommended that the managers be evaluated based on the
amount of funds they expended and then held accountable on their performance
appraisals. The fund expenditures are subject to a number of variables and does not
always reflect a true picture of the managers performance. It is therefore
recommended that the measure of charges for non turn-ins of AV-DLRs and A-799
sign-oils be used at the squadron level to measure the efficiency of the manager. This
information should then be used on the managers performance appraisal.
The NAS commander is issued an operating budget for the AV-DLR funds.
They can then issue an OPTAR to the squadron. The added time and paperwork for
the NAS to issue each squadron an OPTAR and then maintain accounting records
would exceed the benefits of such a system. Therefore it is recommended that the NAS
not issue OPTARS to the squadrons for AV-DLR funding.
2. AIMD Accountability
The previous recommendation will leave the AIMD as the end user that the
NSF charges for the AV-DLRs. Since the squadron and the AIMD are funded with
the same operating budget from the NAS, this is not considered to be a problem. The
"free issue" view of the AV-DLR process to the squadron has changed. Now if the
squadrons are inefficient, not only will they be charged for not turning units in, they
could feel the impact with losses in 0&M,N money that was previously funded for fuel.
The AIMD has to minimize leakages to the system and provide accountability for the
AV-DLRs, to be efficient. A control measure based on the number of times that an
AIMD is charged the standard price for the AV-DLRs should be developed. A ratio
of the number of net price charges to standard price charges would be appropriate.
The higher this number the higher the efficiency. The control measures that are
currently in place on readiness, will continue to provide information on effectiveness.
3. Carcass Tracking
The carcass tracking system must be evaluated. If the problems identified
earlier are Navy wide, then a complete review of the carcass tracking system
procedures should be undertaken. This review should start with the number of
personnel assigned to accomplish the task. At one Air Station, over 10,000 items were
returned to the DOP during the year. Now that the work load has been established a
review of personnel requirements should be simplified. The benefits to this program
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will not materialize until the carcass tracking system is considered tight (i.e., little or no
leakages). It is therefore recommended that any determination on the impact of the
AV-DLR funding conversion to the NSF not be made until a successful enhanced
carcass tracking system is fully operational.
4. Budget
The control measures that have been recommended so far will provide
information to the managers on how effective and efficient the AV-DLR system is.
When an efficient system is in place, forecasting is more predictable. The more
accurate the forecast, the higher the reliablity of the information in developing a
budget. The budget is a very important control measure for the non-profit
organization as stated previously. It is the measure that Congress requires in order to
appropriate money to the Navy. The accuracy of the budget will determine the
amount of money and the ease with which Congress will appropriate the required funds
to the Navy. When the fund request can not be supported with proper documentation,
Congress will restrict the funds.
The budget has to be based on sound information. The budget input should
start at the NAS level and be formulated in order to meet the planning objectives. The
performance standards that are presently in place to determine readiness can be used to
evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The new measures on squadron turn-in
charges and A-799 sign-offs and the AIMD standard price reports should be used to
determine the efficiency of the system. The feedback system on the effectiveness
measures are already in place and the new measures can easily be included on monthly
reports. The actual standards desired to meet the objectives need to be developed so
that managers can monitor any deviations. The early detection of these deviations will
allowr corrective action to be taken so that an effective and efficient system can be
maintained.
This control process will provide Congress with the information that they
require (i.e., the budget) to continue to Appropriate money for the AV-DLR program.
The budget will be determined using sound information from an efficient and effective
system. This will give the budget the creditability that it needs in Congress. The new
control tools should be used by the Navy managers to evaluate their performance. The
Section 1517 responsibility can again be assigned to the managers at the Naval Air
Station when a realistic budget is submitted. An accurate budget is the key to this
system, and that will happen when the managers run the system at the most efficient
and effective level possible.
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E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
1. AV-DLR Carcass Tracking System
A study should be conducted on the AV-DLR carcass tracking system. If the
carcass tracking system is inefficient any results derived from the data obtained on the
funding conversion would be misleading. If the system is determined to be inefficient,
the data collection period for the funding conversion evaluation should be extended.
The data collection period to determine the effectiveness of the conversion to the NSF
ends 1 April 1987.
2. AIMD Work Load
There is now an incentive for the AIMD to repair as many AV-DLRs as
possible. The AIMD is only charged by the NSF for items that are BCM and
returned, as a result the AIMD will work harded to repair them. The number of items
repaired by the AIMD and its work load prior to and after the funding conversion
should be evaluated. This unexpected result from the AV-DLR conversion should
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.
F. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the conclusions and recommendations
of this thesis. First, the conclusions were presented. The lack of certain control
principles prior to the funding conversion were identified. Certain measures and
standards were then discussed. The "ideal" control process was again introduced and
adapted to the system. Second, the recommendations were given. Recommendations
on the funding conversion, the squadron accountability, the AIMD accountability,
carcass tracking, and the control process were listed. The last section discussed areas
for future study.
The recommendations in this study are intended to improve the management
control of AV-DLR funds. The implementation of a management control system
based upon the principles and measures set forth in this thesis, will result in more
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